



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

US ARMY CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY

8120 WOODMONT AVENUE

BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20814

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

*Return to Gen. Wick and
Walters!*

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20 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DA

THRU DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY STAFF

SUBJECT: US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon
Above Corps (U)

1. (U) This is to advise you of my belief that Army arrangements for management of wartime intelligence operations at the theater level are deficient and that remedial actions currently underway are insufficiently focused or coordinated to resolve the problems. In my opinion the fundamental difficulty is a general lack of appreciation for operational matters at theater echelons above corps (EAC) and a concomitant absence of doctrine for dealing with them.*

2. (U) The focus of most Army doctrinal development effort has been at corps level and below, with theater level studies largely confined to matters of support. While some analyses, such as Total Army Analysis (TAA), provide insights into the relative effectiveness of Army program options in comparison with others, there has been insufficient illumination of operational design deficiencies or opportunities for improvement in the effectiveness of the total Allied campaign.

3. (U) Intelligence is a policy and combat support function which should operate in context of the situation, the terrain and the basic mission of the forces with which it is associated. It is a direct contributor to the land battle and, not infrequently, a significant factor in the success or defeat of participants. Our emphasis upon operations at corps and below has provided ample basis for assessment of immediate intelligence requirements at those levels, but we have not had an equivalent exploration of the larger issues of total force requirements and the many special factors connected with a coalition. We overlook these matters at our peril.

4. (S) An example of an important factor which has been overlooked in most studies of EAC intelligence organization is the likelihood of intermingling of US divisions and separate brigades with equivalent allied

* This memorandum is based upon four years' experience and observation, both as Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, HQ USAREUR, and as Commander, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency. While it focuses on problems in Europe, I believe that similar problems are extant, or are likely to develop, elsewhere. Notable among efforts to develop EAC intelligence doctrine have been two versions of draft FM 100-16, the 1979-80 TRADOC EAC study (Woerner Study), a 1979 contract study commissioned by HQ INSCOM, and the current INSCOM in-house effort (Weinstein Study). ODCSI HQ USAREUR conducted a related study in 1980 of requirements for intelligence support to the Central Region. Few common threads link the various studies.

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units across the entirety of the Central Front in a European war. TAA-88 indicates that US forces are likely to be assigned to other than US corps sectors very soon after the onset of hostilities. (See Figure No. 1 below)

TAA-88 US FORCE COMMITMENTS IN EUROPEAN CENTRAL REGION AT D + 32

First Netherlands Corps

49th US Armored Division

First German Corps

1 US armored division equivalent

First Belgian Corps

1st US Cavalry Division

Third US Corps¹.

2nd US Armored Division

4th US Mechanized Division

Third German Corps

1 US mechanized division equivalent

First French Army

7th US Infantry Division

Fifth US Corps².

3rd US Armored Division

8th US Mechanized Division

Seventh US Corps³.

3rd US Mechanized Division

25th US Infantry Division

1 US armored division equivalent

1 US mechanized division equivalent

- Notes: 1. The US III Corps also has the 16th Belgian Division attached.
2. The US V Corps also has the 6th, 7th and 10th French Divisions in Corps reserve.
3. The US VII Corps also has the 12th German Panzer Division attached.

Figure No. 1

5. (S) TAA-88 also indicates that as the US force commitment to the Central Region matures, additional corps sectors will be established and the intermingling of US with Allied forces will continue. By D+92 US divisions are likely to be found deployed in twelve different corps sectors, more than half of which may be commanded by other than US commanders. The issue at hand is that our doctrinal concept of corps level support to US divisions and brigades is likely rapidly to become unsorted. Rather than finding a neat echelonment of responsibilities according to the depth of commander's interest

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on the battlefield, as our doctrine implies, we find a complex mixture of different national units with widely varying reconnaissance capabilities, with little overall coherence. While the problem may be serious in several operational and support areas, it is critical in intelligence because of the magnitude of differences between US and Allied intelligence capabilities and concepts.

6. (U) An unfortunate trap we seem to have fallen into is the consideration of intelligence force requirements in context of a single dimension: the theoretical depth of vision required by each level of command on the battlefield. While such an approach may have utility at tactical levels up through division or corps, there is a fundamental shift of sort - not just of scale - as we consider the theater. At that level matters become multi-dimensional and much more complex. Even if all US forces were to be grouped into corps packages in accordance with our doctrine, we would still encounter other factors impacting upon the intelligence tasks to be accomplished, and hence upon the force development process. Of particular importance are the geography and the political realities of the theater.

7. (U) The most important aspect of the geography in Europe is the location of NATO's most powerful continental partner on the forward edge of the potential battle area. This means that the plan for the defense must be designed for maximum effectiveness well forward. The Alliance cannot expect to trade space for time or to fall very far back upon a major water course if it is to sustain that partner or to realize the value of its contribution. The loss of the forward economic and demographic support base in Germany would be a disaster.

8. (U) Another important aspect is the nature of the terrain in Germany itself, and the location of the centers of mass of both friendly and potentially hostile forces. While Bavaria enjoys relatively favorable defensive country along its eastern border, the terrain to the north tends toward plains. Yet American forces, with their sophisticated reconnaissance systems, are concentrated in the south while the north is expected to be defended, at least initially, by less powerful armies with more rudimentary intelligence support. Conversely, Soviet forces are centrally located and can strike in either direction.

9. (S) The distribution of West German forces is also an important matter, and one which impacts upon and greatly complicates the achievement of a coherent defense. For political reasons German forces are distributed across the length of the front, with other allies assuming sectors in between. While this demonstrates a German willingness to defend their homeland, it practically assures them no two adjacent corps will be of the same nationality. (Even in the exceptional case of the US V and VII Corps, we find the German 12th Panzer Division sandwiched in between.)

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10. (S) The implications of these geographic and political factors for intelligence are many and varied. First, they translate into a heavy emphasis in peacetime on early warning of possible attack by forces of the Warsaw Pact. This requires a broad application of all intelligence disciplines, and manifests itself in substantial investment in installations and activities optimized for that function. In the SIGINT area we require an elaborate network of field stations, remote listening posts and communication links. In HUMINT we rely heavily upon the US Military Liaison Mission accredited to the Soviet High Command, and upon interrogation of knowledgeable border crossers at refugee centers. Overhead imagery is provided through close liaison with Air Force activities flying the Berlin corridors and from national sources.

11. (S) It should be noted that most of these activities may not be available to provide continued support in wartime. SIGINT field stations are not survivable, the Military Liaison Mission will be withdrawn or placed under arrest, air corridors will be closed, and cloud cover is likely to obscure important intelligence targets at critical times. Nevertheless, the need for hard intelligence will not diminish, rather it will become even more time critical. The tasks must be assumed by other assets capable of surviving in war and of fulfilling the special requirements of large land-mass armies engaged in active operations. It follows, therefore, that whatever the intelligence structure may be in peacetime, it must be capable of rapid transformation to a wartime configuration.

12. (U) By and large, the EAC intelligence structures for peace and war are quite different and require substantially different organization, methods of operation and command and control arrangements. While it may be convenient to characterize most Army activities as "designed for war and adjusted for peace," the phrase is not particularly apt for theater intelligence. A clear understanding of the functions and capabilities of EAC intelligence and the means for rapidly transitioning from peace to war is more germane.

13. (S) Another important implication of the characteristics of the theater is the need for full intelligence coverage of the potential front. While virtually all members of the Western Alliance conduct intelligence activities, most of their efforts are designed to support the particular concerns of the countries, none of which have the wealth of technical collection means available to the United States. Typical of the dominance of US intelligence, the Alliance indications and warning system is a replica of the US Warning Indications System, Europe (WISE), and almost wholly dependent upon it. With minor exceptions, it would make little sense to confine US intelligence operations to one sector and to rely upon the Allies for coverage of others. With respect to technical means of intelligence collection, within NATO, the US is a giant among midgets.

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14. (S) The likelihood of widespread deployments of US ground forces in a European war indicates that the breadth of US intelligence coverage should be continued in wartime as well as in peace, even if we consider only the requirements of our own forces. While it might be argued that a real battle manager could group the American forces differently than the TAA war simulation model, it should be recognized that the model seeks to optimize the effectiveness of the defense, and that any other arrangement would be less effective, given the same assumptions regarding enemy force strength, dispositions, timing, etc..

15. (U) Still another implication is the necessity for a common perception of the threat among all Allies participating in the defense structure, and among the various international headquarters. While much coordination and exchange of information can take place by lengthy messages and in conferences on a bilateral or multilateral basis in peacetime, these methods are not well suited for the purpose in a high stress, dynamic environment. In wartime we cannot incur the risk that a US division commander might sense one threat, his (Allied) corps commander another, and commanders at NATO echelons yet a third.

16. (S) Finally, there is the matter of intelligence priorities. While it may make sense for the US Theater or Theater Army Commander to direct the American theater intelligence effort in peacetime, the situation is fundamentally different in war. SACEUR and subordinate NATO commanders are charged with the prosecution of the war at the theater level. If these officers are to fulfill their responsibilities in an efficient way, they must be able to establish priorities and to switch them rapidly as the situation dictates. This leads one to conclude that in wartime these commanders should probably exercise operational control of most theater intelligence assets, or at least enjoy the close relationship of a supported commander with a direct support unit. For the Central Region, CINCENT is the logical authority to give direction to most US Army EAC intelligence assets.*

17. (U) The design of the wartime intelligence structure should be based upon the functions to be performed. These may be summarized as follows:

1. Operational direction of theater level intelligence activities.
2. Data base management and technical analysis.

*It is recognized that this is valid for other Allied EAC intelligence assets as well as US, but the US has much more to contribute. In 1979 CINC USAREUR (GEN Blanchard) approved the "chop" of EAC intelligence structure to AFCEC control. In 1980 GEN Kroesen expressed a preference for the direct support relationship.

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3. National/tactical interface for support by national systems.
4. Liaison with supported international headquarters and other US theater level headquarters and activities.
5. Liaison with host nation intelligence and security organizations and other special activities.
6. Exploitation of knowledgeable persons, documents and captured equipment.
7. Theater level HF/DF SIGINT operations.
8. Army airborne reconnaissance and surveillance in sectors not otherwise covered by US Corps assets.
9. Clandestine HUMINT operations.
10. Counterintelligence operations.
11. Administrative command and control of the intelligence apparatus.

18. (S) The first two functions, operational direction and data base management, can best be accomplished through institution of a survivable intelligence center employing persons with a wide range of skills and all intelligence disciplines. The center needs to be equipped with appropriate automatic data handling equipment and secure communications to all information sources, other services and Allied nations, and supported headquarters and agencies. HQ USAREUR began in March 1979 to deploy such a center on annual NATO "WINTEX" exercises. The center (initially entitled "USAREUR Theater Intelligence Center," or "UTIC") is composed of assets from ODCSI USAREUR, 66th MI Group, the US Army Special Security Group, US Army Cryptologic Support Group, US Army Reserve strategic intelligence detachments. US Air Force intelligence and weather detachments, plus attached communications, military police and support personnel. The bunker complex at Massweiler has been designated as the wartime location of the Center.

19. (S) Particularly important in the Center is a SIGINT coordination and data base management entity known as the Primary Control and Analysis Center (PCAC). Each US Corps has a Forward Control and Analysis Center (FCAC). The PCAC is designed to coordinate all US Army SIGINT collection efforts in the theater in wartime and to interface with similar activities by Allies. Little mobile equipment is now available, and much work is presently done manually when the unit deploys from its garrison location.

20. (S) The third function, national/tactical interface is in addition to the like interface found at US Corps headquarters. The theater intelligence apparatus must have access to US national systems to express the desired priorities of NATO battle managers, to place specific requests and to receive

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information collected. Various ground systems (ITEP, TACIES, etc.) are required for these purposes.

21. (S) The fourth function, liaison with supported headquarters, has been accomplished in Europe through the formation of small intelligence support elements (ISE's). ISE's, headed by field grade officers and equipped with secure communications, are routinely attached to HQ AFCENT, CENTAG, NORTHAG and the USAFE Combat Operations Intelligence Center (COIC) at Ramstein.* In time, ISE's should be extended to LANDJUT and LANDSOUTH and to other NATO headquarters as the need is identified. The senior officer in each ISE is the principal representative of US all-source ground intelligence to the commander and G-2 of the headquarters to which he is accredited. He advises on the capabilities of US intelligence support and conveys the priorities and requests of the supported commanders back to the Intelligence Center. He maintains certain US NOFORN and compartmented information within his element for the eyes of cleared US officers serving in the international headquarters field locations (e.g.; COMCENTAG).

22. (S) Liaison with host nation intelligence and security agencies is similar in organization and operation to the ISE's, but the emphasis is more heavily upon collection and exchange of information. Within Germany, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Agency for Protection of the Constitution (BFV), the Criminal Office (BKA), the Federal Border Guard (BGS), and similar activities within the Ministry of Defense and at the state level, all acquire sensitive information of security value in peacetime. In wartime these activities may be expected to continue to be of high importance as intelligence sources. Good rapport and good communications with these and similar agencies in other friendly countries where troops are deployed must be maintained and expanded in order to insure that the US effort is conducted in context with its Allies and that all threats to US interests are identified early. A wartime requirement of upwards of fifty such liaison elements for the theater would not be surprising.

23. (S) Interrogation of particularly knowledgeable prisoners and other persons, document translation and exploitation, and technical intelligence support are vital functions which must be available at the outset of hostilities. In Europe today, certain elements of the 66th MI Group and DARCOM technical information gathering offices have wartime missions requiring establishment of a theater exploitation center. The three functions of human, document and technical equipment exploitation are

*The COIC is the US Air Force counterpart of the Army Intelligence Center. Each has representation within the other, and, ideally, would be able to serve for a limited time as a backup for the other.

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interrelated and synergistic. All functions operate best in context with one another. We may anticipate that wartime requirements would be heavy. A group-sized structure would probably be necessary for the effective discharge of all three functions.*

24. (S) Theater level SIGINT collection efforts are particularly important in the high frequency direction finding (HF/DF) and VHF airborne intercept areas. HF/DF stations located across the breadth of the front would provide a broad base for accurate direction finding deep in the enemy rear. Airborne platforms, such as GUARD RAIL AND QUICK LOOK systems, provide more shallow support to US units not otherwise supported by US corps collectors and afford a rapid reaction capability for bolstering any sector of the front at critical times. The shorter range systems include tactical consoles, through which the supported unit can receive intelligence relayed by the aircraft. Transmission time from the intercept operator to the front line consumer can thus be reduced to a minimum, even though the systems are managed at a higher echelon of command.

25. (S) Clandestine HUMINT, operations are important to supplement other types of collection. These operations should take several forms. First, any peacetime agents who might be able to continue reporting in wartime should be equipped with long range clandestine radio equipment. Additional agents may be infiltrated as circumstances permit. Military HUMINT sources may infiltrate via stay-behind, surface or airborne techniques. These troops should not be confused with dedicated Special Forces currently designated for a variety of other theater missions. HUMINT assets avoid contact with the enemy and are not tasked to perform combat or interdictive functions which might draw attention to themselves. Requirements exist for establishment of clandestine communications and training and support bases for these activities at the theater level.

26. (U) Counterintelligence units are necessary for the internal security of all Army EAC headquarters and forces in the theater and for assessment and warning of rear area threats in the foreign environment. In addition, reinforcing units from CONUS, arriving in staging of marshalling areas, are particularly vulnerable to hostile intelligence and small unit or guerrilla hit-and-run attacks before they are fully organized for their own security.

* In Vietnam the Combined Document Exploitation Center was processing 1,400 pounds of reports a day in 1967, with multilith press running off 6,000 pages of translations per hour. Interrogation intelligence reports were running at a rate in excess of 1,000 per month. "Go" teams from the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center traveled the length of the country to rapidly identify and exploit new enemy equipment coming under allied control. (See "The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-67" Vietnam Studies, DA. 1974 pp. 37-44.)

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EAC counterintelligence can offer regional OPSEC support, orientation on surrounding conditions, contacts with appropriate host government agencies, and guidance to organic intelligence units to facilitate assumption of their own security responsibilities and missions.

27. (U) Finally, there must be an overall administrative and command and control mechanism for the entire EAC intelligence apparatus. A sensible approach, and the one which has been employed in Europe, is the establishment of a Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIC) under the Theater Army. The TAIC has a small "G" staff, with necessary sections for communications, transport and support. In time of war the DCSI, with most of his office, is detached from USAREUR HQ, and provides leadership for the TAIC. A small intelligence office remains with USAREUR HQ to manage residual intelligence and security functions of that headquarters.* The general organization of the TAIC is shown in Figure 2.

28. (S) To facilitate coordination, control and administrative efficiency, the various field operating units may be grouped either regionally or functionally under MI group headquarters. The group headquarters should be primarily administrative in nature, reporting to the TAIC HQ, with operational control being exercised directly from the Intelligence Center to insure maximum speed in tasking and operational reporting. The TAIC headquarters, and one or more of the group headquarters, should have some operational directive capacity in order to provide additional back-up for the Intelligence Center, should it be disabled and the COIC unable to assume the mission.**

29. (S) It is important to ensure that the Army EAC intelligence structure is fully compatible with the joint and combined structure of the particular theater. In Europe, HQ's AFCENT and AAFCE are served by a US all-source entity in their wartime location called the Tactical Fusion Center (TFC). Developed by the Air Force, the TFC is primarily air intelligence oriented. By agreement between HQ's USAREUR and USAFE, the TAIC Intelligence Support Element is located in the TFC, and the ISE Chief is accredited in CINCENT

*An important point is the fundamental difference between ODCSI and other principal sections of HQ USAREUR. ODCSI has elements capable of providing vital intelligence support to battle managers. The other principal staff sections are designed primarily to fulfill the administrative functions of a theater army headquarters. In its wartime supporting role, HQ USAREUR has little requirement for the type and size of intelligence staff it maintains in peacetime.

**The total TAIC wartime manpower requirement may be expected to approach 10,000. EAC intelligence personnel in Vietnam in 1969 exceeded that figure, but these included all in theater assigned to the Army Security Agency, including direct support units. The percentage of intelligence personnel in the total force has increased in each of the last three wars: World War II-1.04%, Korea-1.63% Vietnam-2.79%. (Office of Military History)

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TYPE THEATER ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND




Figure No. 2


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US EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE
FOR SUPPORT OF AFCE/AAFCE



Note: The Army Intelligence Center works through the Army Intelligence Support Element (ISE) at each headquarters it serves.

Figure 3

and his staff, particularly the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence (ACSI). The close relationship among the TFC, the Air Force COIC and the Army Intelligence Center is shown in Figure 3. This figure also highlights the direct relationships between the COIC and the Allied Tactical Air Forces, on the one hand, and the Army Intelligence Center and the Army Groups, on the other.

30. (U) There are other aspects of EAC intelligence organization and operations which merit attention. Since the establishment of INSCOM, a variety of views have been ventilated on the subject and some temporary agreements achieved. However, few such agreements have been able to stand any serious test of time.

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The principal issues relate to:

1. MACOM subordination and control of EAC assets in theater in peace and war.
2. The wartime responsibilities of HQ INSCOM.
3. Divergencies between doctrinal concepts and theater imperatives affecting actual employment of intelligence assets.

31. (U) A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this memorandum. My observation is that most participants in the debate assume unsurprising stands related to narrowly drawn interests of the organizations to which they are assigned. I have dealt with this phenomenon in an article published in ARMY (see "When Turfs Overlap," incl.).

32. (U) I recommend that a fresh approach be taken toward the Army EAC intelligence problem. I believe we need to develop definitive concepts for intelligence organization and operations on a theater-by-theater basis with the theater commanders taking the lead. This is the normal procedure for force development, and I see no reason to do otherwise in this case. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, many peculiarities of European Theater come into play in identifying the requirements for that region. We may expect that the same pertains to northeast and southwest Asia. We should not wait for the development of abstract doctrine to determine our theater requirements. The utility of generic doctrine varies inversely with the level of command under examination.

33. (U) Further, I recommend that INSCOM, and TRADOC participate in and support the development effort. ACSI, DA should referee the process and insure that all interests are represented. Failure to fulfill legitimate command concerns, particularly those of the theater involved is likely to reproduce the truncated documents extant on the subject. I would be happy to assist in such an effort in any way I can.

1 Incl
asEDWARD B. ATKESON
Major General, USA
Commanding~~SECRET~~